农户联保贷款制度的博弈机制及其实践分析Game Theory Analysis of Rural Micro-credit System
罗琦
摘要(Abstract):
农户联保贷款制度是为缺乏抵押和担保能力的农民群体服务的一种金融创新方式。联保贷款制度在实际运行当中效果并不理想,运用博弈论分析影响农户还款积极性的关键因素,发现由于联保小组组建困难,联保条件过于苛刻,手续过于繁杂以及机会主义与道德风险造成了农户联保贷款制度不能有效推行,并提出了相应的对策建议。
关键词(KeyWords): 农村金融;农户联保贷款;还款博弈
基金项目(Foundation):
作者(Author): 罗琦
DOI: 10.16195/j.cnki.cn36-1328/f.2013.04.013
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